If you haven’t already, you might like to read Part 1 and Part 2.
In 1978 the situation in Iran was tense. Student groups, opposition groups and militias were demonstrating against Shah Pahlavi. The economic situation had deteriorated.
A key turning point occurred on 19 August 1978, when the Cinema Rex fire by Islamic militants killed around 400 people. However a large portion of the public believed it was a false flag operation by SAVAK, the Shah’s secret police, to discredit the opposition and justify a crackdown, fueling nationwide outrage and mobilization. Wikipedia
The Carter administration was concerned the Soviet Union could exploit the situation to gain influence in Iran.
The White House feared an Iranian civil war that would have major implications for US strategic interests. At stake were the lives of thousands of US military advisors; the security of sophisticated American weapons systems in Iran, such as F-14 jets; a vital flow of oil; and the future of the most important institution of power in Iran, the military. It was less alarmed by the rise of Khomeini, and the downfall of the Shah. BBC
William H Sullivan was the US ambassador to Iran. He compared Khomeini to a “Gandhi-like figure,” viewing him as a religious figurehead who might return to a quiet role in Qom rather than seeking absolute political power.
On 9 November 1978, in a now-famous cable, “Thinking the Unthinkable,” the US ambassador to Iran, William Sullivan, warned that the Shah was doomed. He argued that Washington should get the Shah and his top generals out of Iran, and then make a deal between junior commanders and Khomeini. BBC
In January 1979 the Ayatollah Khomeini contacted the Carter administration.
From his home in exile outside Paris, the defiant leader of the Iranian revolution effectively offered the Carter administration a deal: Iranian military leaders listen to you, he said, but the Iranian people follow my orders. BBC
Carter sent General Robert E Huyser to Iran where he met with military leaders but not the Shah. According to him and Carter his mission was to preserve the military. He arranged meetings between the military leaders and Khomeini allies. The stated purpose was to encourage prime minister Shapour Bakhtiar‘s transitional government. This government didn’t last long. The real outcome was the Iranian military stayed neutral.
The Carter administration convinced the Shah to come to California on a vacation, believing his life was in danger. 2 days later the US told a Khomeini envoy that they were, in principle, open to the idea of changing the Iranian constitution.
In mid-to-late January 1979, according to the declassified documents, Carter’s government admitted that the (Iranian) military, whom were having daily talks with Huyser, would have “no fundamental problems” with the abolishment of the monarchy — as long as the eventual result would come gradually and in a controlled way. Khomeini and his entourage took this as a de facto admittance that Carter had discarded Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Wikipedia
On 1 February1979 the exiled Khomeini returned to Tehran. The Iranian military largely stayed out of the way of the revolution. Soldiers had begun to desert to join the protesters and a group had mutinied and shot several officers. The troops were called back to their barracks. Khomeini became a popular leader of the revolution.
Bakhtiar’s transitional government became increasingly isolated and a conflict between he and Khomeini was unavoidable. Some military units left their posts and joined the revolutionaries; distributing weapons and ammunition. Loyal units began to battle them.
The final collapse of the Bakhtiar’s government came at 10 am (local time) on 11 February when the Supreme Military Council declared itself “neutral in the current political disputes … in order to prevent further disorder and bloodshed.” Wikipedia
On February 14, 1979, the U.S. Embassy in Teheran was overrun by several different armed groups and the staff was taken hostage. They wouldn’t be released until Ronald Reagan’s inauguration day 20 January 1981. This led to speculation Reagan had negotiated with Khomeini to hold the hostages through the elections (October Surprise Theory).
During the entire crisis Carter relied on the CIA for information and guidance. The CIA also coordinated meetings and facilitated communications between various parties.
- Two Weeks in January: America’s secret engagement with Khomeini BBC Canada
- Office of the Chief of Staff Files, Hamilton Jordan’s Confidential Files Jimmy Carter Library
- U.S. WAS REPORTEDLY URGED TO KILL SHAH – NY Times
- Islam in Iran (declassified CIA government document) BBC
- US had extensive contact with Ayatollah Khomeini before Iran revolution The Guardian
- Ruhollah Khomeini’s contacts with the United States Wikipedia
- Iranian Revolution Wikipedia